According to the analytical institute Robert Lansing Institute (RLI), Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán—long known as a promoter of Russian interests within the EU—has recently ramped up efforts to bypass sanctions against Russia. A new triangle is forming between Budapest, Astana, and Tashkent. Officially, this alliance is geared toward trade and investment, but in reality, it creates loopholes for Russian businesses, potentially under Kremlin patronage.
Trade volumes have significantly increased within this cooperation, with the creation of joint investment funds, special economic zones, and plans for industrial parks, logistics hubs, and energy collaboration. Hungary aims to become a key transit link in trade routes from Asia to Europe and has signed a memorandum on the Trans-Caspian corridor with Kazakhstan’s KTZ Express, Hungary’s L.A.C. Holding, and China’s Xi’an International Port.
This is the “white” side of the process—seemingly normal economic relations. However, factoring in Orbán’s geopolitical motives, a different picture emerges. He is reinforcing an eastern vector as an alternative to Brussels’ influence. His relationships with Moscow, Beijing, and Central Asia serve as a balancing act that now crosses dangerous lines. Hungary’s eastern economic successes risk triggering Western sanctions.
Orbán is effectively trading EU loyalty for Kremlin favor, blocking key EU decisions in exchange for financial perks from Russia, which consolidate his domestic power and enrich his loyal business networks. At this point, Budapest and Moscow operate like a criminal enterprise with opaque, billion-euro flows.
From this angle, Hungary’s cooperation with Central Asia enters a grey zone. Although Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan condemned Russia’s aggression at the UN, they never joined the sanctions. Like Orbán, they straddle between the West and Moscow—“they’ve found each other.” Trade with Russia in Western-controlled goods has surged. For example, Kazakhstan’s computer imports have risen sevenfold since 2022, far beyond domestic demand. Microchip exports to Russia jumped 7300%, from $245K in 2021 to $18M in 2022.
Here’s how it works: intermediary firms purchase Western electronics (e.g., in Hungary or Germany), import them to Kazakhstan under the guise of domestic use, and re-export them to Russia as local goods. The same method is used to smuggle dual-use goods—military-applicable items. Since Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are members of the Eurasian Economic Union, there are no customs borders with Russia—once a shipment enters Kazakhstan, it moves freely to Russia.
Special economic zones help further by enabling goods to be rebranded before reaching Russia. Hungarian experts and technologies handed over to Central Asian partners could end up with Russian recipients. Both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are now limiting publication of detailed customs data, complicating investigations.
Knowing Orbán’s alignment with the Kremlin, it would be strange not to see him involved. Hungarian companies and OTP Bank act as intermediaries, allowing Russian capital to use Uzbekistan’s banking channels to bypass EU controls. Hungarian oil firm MOL profits from sanction loopholes and continues importing Russian oil.
So what’s really happening? Orbán is undermining EU sanctions unity, both politically and economically, to ease pressure on Moscow. Now, Budapest also helps Moscow operate behind the smokescreen of Central Asian trade.
Orbán is playing a dangerous game. He sows division within the EU and sends a signal to other authoritarian regimes: sanctions can be survived with the help of “friends” in the opposing camp. He’s effectively creating an EU-based hub where Moscow’s money meets Beijing’s investments—a serious threat to European cohesion.
The winners? Moscow and Orbán. Not Hungary, which is increasingly viewed as a “Russian spy base.” This problem must be addressed firmly, democratically—and urgently. 24brussels.online